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FARMERS INVESTMENT COMPANY v. BETTWY:
A JUDICIAL RESTRICTION OF
GROUND WATER WITHDRAWALS,
COERCING THE ARIZONA LEGISLATURE TO ACT
INTRODUCTION
In the arid southwestern United States,1 water is the primal ele-
ment of survival. It is fundamental to all phases of the southwestern
economy: to industry, to agriculture, to population centers. Unfor-
tunately, due largely to inaccurate hydrologic modeling and to un-
tutored, irresponsible legislation, already scarce supplies of ground
water have been consistently depleted since the advent of modem
civilization in the Southwest. Judicial attempts to deal with the
ground water problem have generally fared little better than legis-
lative efforts, resulting in unrealistic if not misleading legal concepts
which have only added to the atmosphere of uncertainty pervading
the area.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Arizona, however,
which essentially limits the use of all municipalities and industries to
waters underlying their immediate boundaries, may have initiated a
process which will ultimately result in affirmative legislative action
and, hopefully, in a more realistic ground water policy for the State
of Arizona.
THE GROUNDWATER PROBLEM OF THE SOUTHWEST
Agriculture has long been the economic mainstay of the South-
west, with approximately thirty-one million acres of irrigated surface
area devoted to agricultural pursuits as of 1959.2 Irrigated surface
area seems to be increasing with time, as this figure represents a 76%
increase in irrigated acreage over 1939.' Due in part to extensive
agricultural acreage, to scarce annual precipitation, and to high
ambient temperatures which increase the amount of water lost
through evapotranspiration, agricultural uses comprise approximately
90-95% of the total water consumption of the Southwest.4
The southwestern United States is rich in mineral resources, in-
1. For the purposes of this comment, "southwestern United States" includes western
Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and southern California.
2. V. RUT-AN, THE ECONOMIC DEMAND FOR IRRIGATED ACREAGE 34 (1964).
3. Id.
4. N. WOLLMAN, THE VALUE OF WATER IN ALTERNATIVE USES 94 (1962).
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
cluding metallic and nonmetallic mineral deposits and hydrocarbons.
A large percentage of the nation's native gold, silver, copper, lead,
zinc, petroleum and petroleum related products, natural gas, ura-
nium, and potash deposits occur in this region.' Water, one natural
resource in which the region is deficient, is vital to the operation and
maintenance of nearly all mining and milling operations.
An active mining industry, a ready availability of raw materials for
manufacturing and an aesthetically pleasing environment have com-
bined with other factors to make the southwestern United States one
of the fastest growing regions in the United States.6 Rapid infusion
of population into municipalities, generally logistically unprepared
for expansion, has in many instances resulted in an uncontrolled,
disorganized proliferation of urban areas without regard to existing
water supplies.7 As a result, municipalities have depleted their
domestic water supplies to the point of near exhaustion and have
then attempted to expand their water right, either by extension of
municipal boundaries, by extension of the water right itself,8 or by
importation of water from outside the municipal boundaries from
other areas. 9
The absolute industrial, agricultural, and municipal dependence
upon a ready supply of quality water coupled with the limited avail-
5. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO.
MIC58(l)-10C (1958) (regional breakdown of employment by and expenditures in the
copper, lead, zinc, gold, and silver mining industries); cf U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. MIC58(I)-10E (1958) (regional breakdown of
employment by and expenditures in the uranium industry); cf. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. MkCS8(I)-13A (1958) (regional breakdown of
employment by and expenditures in the petroleum and natural gas industry).
6. See Mann, Law and Politics of Water in Arizona, 2 ARIZ. L. REV. 241, 266 (1960)
[hereinafter referred to as Mann, 2 ARIZ. L. REV.], where the author notes that the
populations of Phoenix and Tucson doubled between 1960 and 1975;see R. APPELBAUM,
THE EFFECTS OF URBAN GROWTH-A POPULATION IMPACT ANALYSIS 4-7 (1973),
where it is noted that the population of Anaheim, California doubled between 1960 and
1970 and that by 1980 the population of Santa Barbara County is projected to exceed that
measured in 1940 by 700%.
7. The cities of Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona have long been importing water from
surrounding areas. El Paso, Texas has already experienced significant drawdown in its pri-
mary source of supply, the Hueco Bolson area. The U.S.G.S. projects a 140 foot drawdown
at the point of greatest depletion for the Hueco Bolson area by 1991. W. MEYER, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DIGITAL MODEL FOR SIMULATED
EFFECTS OF GROUND-WATER PUMPING IN THE HUECO BOLSON AREA, TEXAS,
NEW MEXICO, AND MEXICO 25 (Water Resources Investigation Report No. 58-75, 1976).
8. This primarily refers to the exercise of the fabled "Pueblo Rights Doctrine," see City
of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1889); and Cartwright v. Public Service
Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958).
9. The city of Tucson, the municipality in question under the principle case, imports a
large part of its water from outside the Tucson Basin. Notably, it imports water from the
outlying Avra-Altar and Santa Cruz Valleys. See text accompanying footnote 39 and foot-
note 44, under the discussion of Arizona water law.
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ability of such water has resulted in a water based economic and
political structure.' 0 In this structure, mining, agricultural, and
municipal uses' 1 compete for the finite quantity of water available,
the preponderance of which are underground waters.' 2 Water there-
by becomes the limiting factor, determining the extent of all indus-
trial, agricultural, and municipal maintenance, development, and
expansion. Accordingly, "... the control of water becomes the key
to prosperity, growth, and political and economic power .... ,
Political pressures inevitably resulting from this situation have
been particularly effective in determining the extent of ground water
legislation in any given area.' ' This effectiveness has largely been
due to the complex and oftentimes confused hydrologic nature of
ground water occurrence, which has given rise to myriad legal
theories, providing almost any political contingent with a viable argu-
ment for or against its particular objective. Most of these legal
theories arguably have some merit, depending upon the hydrologic
model to which they are applied; many we now recognize, however,
are based on scientifically unsound hydrologic models, reflecting the
lack of sophistication of hydrology at the time the legal concepts
were formulated.' I
One faulty hydrologic model is that differentiating surface and
ground waters, failing to recognize the inextricable link between the
two! 6 The legal concept that surface stream appropriators and well
users can be treated differently in water use regulation, the surface
10. D. MANN, THE POLITICS OF WATER IN ARIZONA (1963) [hereinafter referred
to as D. MANN, POLITICS].
11. Recreational and conservational uses have not traditionally been considered as com-
peting uses. However, there is little question that they will be in the future in light of the
extensive state and federal investments in recreational complexes, wildlife refuges, and
associated endeavors, all of which require water to be maintained. The New Mexico legisla-
ture considered a bill in their 1977 session which declared recreational and conservational
uses beneficial uses within the meaning of the prior appropriation statutes.
12. Arizona, which receives more surface water than many western states, via the Colo-
rado River, depends upon groundwater for 65% of its total supply. Clark, Groundwater
Management: Law and Local Response, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 178, 190-191 (1965); see D.
MANN, POLITICS, supra note 10, at 43.
13. F. MOSS, THE WATER CRISIS 12 (1967).
14. "Opposition within the state has blocked enactment of several proposed ground
water statutes, and has delayed several others from varying periods of years. Objections
come from persons who want no legal restrictions upon individual pumping; or who con-
sider public control unnecessary, undesirable or impracticable; or who question the consti-
tutionality of proposed measures; and possibly from other sources as well." Hutchins,
Trends in the Statutory Law of Groundwater in the Western States, 34 TEXAS L. REV.
155, 183 (1955); see D. MANN, POLITICS, supra note 10, at 66-77;see generally, 2 ARIZ.
L. REV., supra note 6.
15. H. THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUNDWATER 243 (1951); Clark,
Arizona Ground Water: The Need for Legislation, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (1974).
16. H. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 240-50.
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use being controlled by priority of use and the underground use not
being controlled at all, is one unrealistic result of this erroneous
model.1 I Ultimately, application of this legal concept can result in
depletion of surface supplies by the unregulated underground users.
A second inaccurate model divides underground waters into sub-
classes of underground streams and percolating waters, the law
governing the water depending upon the classification. 1 8 Under
California law percolating waters are governed by the doctrine of
correlative rights, which gives each landowner a right held in com-
mon with other landowners overlying the same supply to reasonable
beneficial use of the water.1 9 Underground streams, however, are
subject to appropriative and riparian rights.2" In Arizona, under-
ground streams are a public resource and are thus appropriable,
whereas percolating waters are the property of the overlying land-
owner and are subject only to reasonable use.2 Percolating waters in
Texas are governed by the English doctrine, whereby the owner of
the surface may ". . use all of the percolating waters he [can] cap-
ture from wells on his land for whatever beneficial purposes he
[needs] it, on or off the land, and [he can] likewise sell it to either
use off or on the land and outside the basin where produced.. .," 2
Underground stream ownership and use in Texas is not governed by
the English doctrine, but is largely dependent upon the rule in the
particular underground water district where the water is located.2 '
In light of the advanced state of hydrology, it would seem that
state legislatures would be able to formulate a sound ground water
policy and an effective system of administration; in light of the
overwhelming importance of ground water to the southwestern states
it would seem that state legislatures would be eager to do so. This,
however, for political reasons or otherwise, has proved to not be the
case, state legislatures having tended to deal with ground water prob-
lems superficially or not at all.2 4
17. Id.
18. Most western states adhere to this classification in one form or another. Notably,
California, Arizona, and Texas. See Clark, supra note 15, at 800-01, and authority cited
therein for a more in depth analysis of the evolution of the distinction; see H. THOMAS,
supra note 15, at 249-50.
19. 1. H. ROGERS & H. NICHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA'S 249 (1967).
20. Id.
21. Bristor v. Cheatham, 25 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953),rev'gon rehearing 73 Ariz.
228, 240 P.2d 185 (1962).
22. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801
(1955).
23. 60 TEX. JUR.2d Waters § 219 (1964); see Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. East, 98 Tex.
146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).
24. See Hutchins, supra note 14, and Clark, supra note 12.
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The judiciary, however, has been routinely faced with issues re-
garding the ownership, use, etc., of underground waters. More fre-
quently than not, the result of adjudication in a nonexistent or
ambiguous legislative framework has been unrealistic and inconsis-
tent rulings, creating even greater confusion among water users as to
the state of the law.
ARIZONA-A CASE OF LEGISLATIVE INACTION
An examination of judicial ground water law in Arizona prior to
Farmer's Investment Company v. Bettwy2" presents a picture of
legislative apathy and judicial inconsistency. Howard v. Perrin2 6 was
the first Arizona Supreme Court case to distinguish ". . . running
stream[s] flowing in natural channels between well-defined
banks ..... " from "... . filtrating or percolating waters oozing through
the soil beneath the surface in undefined and unknown chan-
nels. "2 7 The court ruled that, in keeping with the applicable
statutes, underground streams were appropriable but percolating
waters were not. While determining that the defendant had no water
right because he had not proved the water in question to be an
underground stream and thus appropriable, the court did not rule as
to how rights to percolating waters were to be acquired.
In the interim between Howard v. Perrin and Bristor v. Cheat-
ham2 8 the Arizona legislature, responding to agricultural and execu-
tive pressures, 2 9 enacted the Ground Water Code of 1948.30 The
primary impact of the Code, still in effect today, is to provide for the
creation of critical ground water areas,3 wherein the State Land
Commissioner may restrict drilling for agricultural purposes within
certain parameters. The Code, however, has no effect on ". . . the
withdrawal of ground water used for domestic, stock watering, indus-
trial, or transportation purposes." 3 2 This shortcoming and others led
one commentator to note that "... everyone admitted [the Code]
was a stop-gap measure designed to slow down the rapid depletion of
ground water but certainly not to solve the long-range problem of
25. 558 P.2d 14 (1976).
26. 76 P. 460 (1904).
27. Id. at 462.
28. 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953), rev'gon rehearing 73 Ariz. 228, 240 P.2d 185
(1952).
29. Mann, 2 ARIZ. L. REV., supra note 6, at 250-5 1.
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-301, et seq. (1956), as amended, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 45-301, et. seq. (Supp. 1976-77).
31. " 'Critical ground water area' means any ground water basin ... not having sufficient
ground water to provide a reasonably safe supply for irrigation of the cultivated lands in the
basin at the then current rates of withdrawal." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-301(1) (1956).
32. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-301(2) (Supp. 1976-77).
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balancing agricultural development with the available water sup-
ply." 3 3
Bristor v. Cheatham34 responded to the question posed by How-
ard v. Perrin,3  defining how rights to percolating waters are ac-
quired and governed. First the court ruled that percolating waters are
not appropriable, by construction of an Arizona statute which failed
to specifically designate percolating waters as appropriable.3 6 Then,
absent any legislative guide as to the preferable system, the court
went on to determine that the reasonable use doctrine is the body of
law applicable to percolating waters. Under Bristor I, the owner of
lands overlying subterranean waters ". . . may extract such water for
reasonable, beneficial use of the land from which the same is taken."
(emphasis added). 3 7 It was noted that "[t]he principle difficulty in
the application of the reasonable use doctrine is in determining what
is reasonable use." 3 8
Later supreme court decisions gradually weakened the terms of
the Bristor 11 reasonable use doctrine, eventually allowing water to
be transported off of the land from which it was withdrawn. Jarvis v.
State Land Department3 9 had the greatest effect upon the Bristor II
ruling, largely in reliance on additional inadequate and ambiguous
legislation. Petitioners in Jarvis H alleged that the City of Tucson,
located fifteen miles outside of the Avra-Altar Valley drainage area,
was violating the court's injunction by pumping percolating waters
out of the largely agricultural Marana Critical Ground Water Area,
contained within the Avra-Altar Valley drainage area. The court
ruled that Tucson was violating the injunction by its pumping, but
continued that ". . . if Tucson acquires land within the Avra-Altar
Valleys overlooking the Marana Critical Groundwater Area it may
withdraw water from the basin for municipal use to the same extent
as water previously withdrawn for use on those lands." (emphasis
added).4 0 Recognizing that the holding was contrary to reasonable
33. MANN, 2 ARIZ. L. REV., supra note 6, at 251. Mann's article presents an excellent
overview of the political aspects of Arizona ground water law.
34. 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953), rev'g on rehearing 73 Ariz. 228, 240 P.2d 185
(1952) [hereinafter referred to as Bristor 1I].
35. 76 P. 460 (1904).
36. "The waters of all sources, flowing in streams, ravines, or other natural channels, or
in definite underground channels ... and of lakes, ponds and springs on the surface belong
to the public and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use as provided in this chap-
ter." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-101(A) (1956).
37. Bristor 11, supra note 34, 255 P.2d at 178.
38. Id. at 179.
39. 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Jarvis Ill. See
Arizona Supreme Court-Reasonable Use of Percolating Ground Water, 13 ARIZ. L. REV.
490 (1971), for more detailed discussion of Jarvis I1.
40. Jarvis ll, supra note 39, 479 P.2d at 174.
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use as defined in Bristor II, the Jarvis II court relied on an Arizona
statute ranking the relative value of uses for appropriated waters,4 1
placing domestic and municipal uses over agricultural uses.4 2 Thus,
Jarvis H essentially overruled the Bristor II holding which restricted
use to the overlying lands, to allow withdrawal and transportation of
waters off of the overlying lands to points outside of the drainage
basin.
Responsible legislation would have precluded any doubt as to how
rights were acquired in percolating waters, alleviating the necessity
for judicial guesswork as to legislative intent. With the exception of
the Ground Water Code of 1948, the Arizona legislature had consis-
tently refused to act positively with regard to groundwater; the
status of groundwater law was uncertain as of 1976 due to the incon-
sistent holdings of Bristor II and Jarvis II. Clearly, there was a need
for decisive action on the part of the legislature.
FICO
The action came, however, not from the Arizona legislature but
from the Supreme Court of Arizona, in the form of three consoli-
dated decisions, entitled Farmer's Investment Company v. Bettwy,
Farmer's Investment Company v. The Anaconda Company, and City
of Tucson v. Anamax Mining Company.4 3 The parties to the action
were Farmer's Investment Company, 4 4 the City of Tucson, Anamax
Copper Company, Amax Copper Mining, Inc., the Anaconda Com-
pany, Pima Mining Company, Duval Mining Company, and the Ari-
zona State Land Department. With the exception of the land
department all parties were using water from the Santa Cruz River
watershed, at least part of which was from the Sahuarita-Continental
Critical Ground Water Area. Tucson's use was primarily domestic and
municipal and FICO's use, dating from 1915, was purely agricultural.
Anamax, Anaconda, Amax, Pima, and Duval used the water in their
mining, milling, and tailings plant operations. The State Land Depart-
ment was a party only because it had granted a state lease of land in
the Santa Cruz valley to Duval.
FICO, owner of irrigated agricultural lands in the Santa Cruz val-
ley, south of Tucson, sought an injunction against Anaconda and
Amax as joint operators of Anamax and against Pima. FICO was
41. Note that the waters in question, percolating waters, were not subject to appropria-
tion under Arizona law. The court, however, apparently had not other indicator of legisla-
tive intent as to the relative priority of uses.
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-147(B) (Supp. 1976-77).
43. 558 P.2d 14 (1976) [hereinafter referred to collectively as FICOJ.
44. Hereinafter referred to as FICO.
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seeking to enjoin the mining companies from pumping ground water
from the critical ground water area in the Santa Cruz valley for use in
their mining operations lying outside of the critical area. The City of
Tucson, as intervenor, brought a complaint against Duval, seeking to
enjoin it from withdrawing water from the Santa Cruz valley and
returning it to the water supply after industrial use in its mining
operations. The basis of Tucson's complaint was that the returned
waters were of such a low quality after the industrial use that the
waters of the valley were being rendered unfit for domestic and
municipal uses. Tucson had a long record of using water from wells
within the Santa Cruz River watershed, which was transported after
withdrawal thirty miles northward to the city. Duval counterclaimed
against Tucson, claiming that Tucson's withdrawal and transporta-
tion of water from the valley was depleting Duval's supply.
The FICO decision revolved around the superior court's ruling on
Anamax' motion for partial summary judgment against Tucson that
"[w] ater may be pumped from one parcel of land to another parcel if
both parcels overlie a common basin or supply and if the water is put
to reasonable use."'4  This ruling was the basis for the superior
court's denial of FICO's application for preliminary injunction
against the mining companies and for its injunction of Tucson from
pumping and transporting waters from the basin at rates exceeding
1972 levels. The supreme court set aside the lower court's rulings
with respect to FICO, remanding the case with instructions to enjoin
the mining companies. Tucson's injunction, limiting Tucson to 1972
pumping and transporting rates, was upheld.
In the supreme court's view there was one issue, basic to all three
appeals, presented by the lower court's decision:
Whether the doctrine of reasonable use ... permits percolating
waters to be used off of lands from which they are pumped if
thereby others whose lands overlie the common supply are injured
or damaged thereby.4 6
To decide the issue the court first looked to the doctrine of reason-
able use "... as it has heretofore been judicially determined in Ari-
zona. . .". -4 Relying primarily on Bristor H and authority citied
therein, the court narrowly construed the statement of the Bristor H
court that ".... the American rule [is] that one may extract such
water for a reasonable, beneficial use of the land from which the
45. FICO, supra note 43, 558 P.2d at 18.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id.
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same is taken,"' ' insisting that the water be withdrawn for the
beneficial enjoyment of that particular land.4 I Referring to Canada
v. City of Shawnee, 0 cited in Bristor 1I,"' the court then empha-
sized that the reasonable use doctrine prohibits the withdrawal of
water for use on other land if the use of water by neighboring land-
owners is interfered with or if supplies underlying neighboring lands
are diminished.' 2 In light of the court's statement that their ruling is
not predicated on the pumping of groundwater from critical areas,' '
it can be inferred that the court has adopted a broad definition of
neighboring lands, whereby a depletion of water anywhere within the
watershed would constitute a violation of reasonable use.
Going beyond Canada v. City of Shawnee, 4 which required ac-
tual harm, the court granted relief to FICO, stating: "[Tihe water
table ... is being lowered and the reservoir of supply is being deple-
ted.***[T] he additional pumping proposed by Anamax ... will nec-
essarily further deplete the source of supply .... ***FICO need not
wait for its farms to be devastated before applying for injunctive
relief against unlawful acts." (emphasis added).' I Prospective harm,
not actual harm, seems to be enough under the FICO ruling to enjoin
withdrawal and transportation.
In determining that the copper mines should be enjoined from
pumping water to their operations from within the watershed, the
court implicitly overruled Jarvis II, instituting a strict form of the
Bristor II holding. It stated that Jarvis II is not ". . . precedent for a
doctrine that a court will prefer one economic interest over another
on an ad hoc basis where there are not enough of the material goods
to go around." ' 6 The court called upon the legislature to ". . . desig-
nate when and under what conditions such economic interests will
prevail."I I
One of the bases of the ruling, which dealt exclusively with per-
colating waters not previously subject to appropriation, was that the
"mining companies position flies in the face of the maxim 'first in
time, first in right'. ... ***[T] he [mining companies] are asking this
48. Bristor 11, supra note 34, 255 P.2d at 178.
49. FICO, supra note 43, 558 P.2d at 20.
50. 179 Oki. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936).
51. Supra note 34, 255 P.2d at 178.
52. FICO, supra note 43, 558 P.2d at 19-20.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Supra note 50.
55. FICO, supra note 43, 558 P.2d at 23.
56. Id. at 21.
57. Id.
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Court to . prefer the interests of mining over farming, irrespective
of the time when rights were acquired .... "5 8 This language can
only be taken as an indication that, in the supreme court's view, the
reasonable use doctrine under Arizona law either has assumed or
should assume the priority aspect of the appropriative system, where-
by earlier use determines the better right.' 9
THE IMPORTANCE OF FICO
FICO, while not defining as a matter of law what is a reasonable
use of percolating water in Arizona, went a long way in determining
what is an unreasonable use. From the basic issue of the case, the
FICO court developed a two pronged test to determine unreasonable-
ness:
1. Is the water being transported off of the land from beneath
which it was withdrawn?
2. Is the withdrawal and transportation off of the land harming
landowners whose lands overlie the common supply? If the answer to
both of these questions is yes, then the user will be enjoined from
transporting the water. Under the court's broad definition of neigh-
boring lands it is clear that pumping in any area in which there is not
sufficient water to supply existing users, not just in critical ground
water areas, will result in a depletion or prospective depletion of
supplies. Under the court's definition of harm, even prospective
depletion will be enough to harm neighboring landowners. Thus, if
the pumped water is subsequently transported for use off of the
particular parcel of property from which it was pumped, the court's
test will be satisfied.
The effects of the FICO ruling are far reaching. FICO stands for
the proposition that municipalities will essentially not be permitted
to pump additional water for use within their boundaries from any-
where except beneath the municipality; no water may be imported
to the municipality other than that quantity designated by the court
as an existing right of the city. 60 For Phoenix and Tucson, the
state's two largest cities, this has serious implications, as domestic
supplies are already severely strained. Mining and industrial users are
similarly restricted in their supply, being limited to withdrawals from
beneath their immediate properties. Agricultural users are subject to
the same limitations, but are generally in a better position to con-
58. Id.
59. Note from text accompanying footnote 39 that FICO began using water in the area
prior to the mines, in 1915.
60. Tucson was limited in its withdrawals from the Santa Cruz valley to a 1972 rate.
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tinue operating because they have a more extensive surface area from
which to draw and they ordinarily are located in areas with a more
abundant underlying supply, i.e., in valleys, rather than in mountain-
ous terrain.
At first impression the FICO decision may seem to be a socially
insensitive, unreasonable adjudication in that it cuts off the cities and
mines from vital water supplies; it puts them in a position where
expansion or even operation at present levels is impractical or im-
possible. The redeeming feature of the decision, however, is that it
exerts a pressure on the cities and mines which is in turn transmitted
to the state legislature, forcing the legislature to define the law appli-
cable to percolating waters and to define the relative values of com-
peting uses. Another desirable feature of the decision is that by
referring to "first in time, first in right" it provides the legislature
with some indication of the judicial preference for the form of the
applicable law.
CONCLUSION
FICO demonstrates a growing awareness among the judiciary of
the importance of a responsible, hydrologically sound system of
water rights administration.6 1 The importance of such a system is
not limited to Arizona as it is not the only state with water scarcity
problems which have arisen from basic misconceptions regarding the
occurrence of ground water. Texas and California, to name only two
others, are also water-poor states with largely mismanaged water
resources resulting from ill-conceived hydrologic concepts. 6 2
FICO demonstrates the judicial awareness that, in light of the
importance of water to all phases of southwestern economy, an ad-
judication is not the proper procedure for determination of basic
water policy issues, but that the legislature has the duty to make
these determinations.6 3
CLIFFORD K. ATKINSON
61. See Widman, Ground Water-Hydrology and the Problems of Competing Well Own-
ers, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 523, 568 (1968), where the author propounds the
necessity for judicial awareness.
62. See generally Clark, Groundwater Management: Law and Local Response, 6 ARIZ.
L. REV. 178, 182-84 (1965), for a more in depth discussion of Texas and California water
law.
63. See Johnson, The Changing Role of the Courts in Water Quality Management,
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 196 (1968).
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